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Andrzej Sadecki, Tadeusz Iwański
For nearly one year relations between Hungary and Ukraine have been plunged in the worst crisis 
since the collapse of the USSR. The main cause of the tension has been the Education Act passed 
by the Ukrainian parliament in September 2017 which envisages a comprehensive reform of the 
education system and at the same time imposes serious restrictions on the use of the languages 
of national minorities, including Hungarian, in school education. In response to this, Budapest 
severely criticised Kyiv and took measures to block the establishment of closer relations between 
Ukraine and NATO, insisting that the act be changed. In turn, Ukraine took steps to soften 
Budapest’s stance and asked the Venice Commission to evaluate the act and then declared that 
it would follow the recommendations provided in the evaluation. The deficit of trust which has 
existed for years and the fact that neither of the parties had taken real steps to reach a compro-
mise prevented them from reaching an agreement that had seemed close in May and June this 
year. The conflict was escalated further when the Hungarian government appointed a ministerial 
commissioner for the development of Zakarpattia Oblast (in Ukraine), which met with a harsh 
reaction from Kyiv and was interpreted as interfering with Ukraine’s internal affairs.
The dispute over the Hungarian minority’s rights in Ukraine is about historical and identity related 
issues that are very important to both sides, and it is highly unlikely that it will be resolved in the 
coming months. While these issues have always been at the core of Budapest’s foreign policy, 
especially with regard to the countries where the Hungarian minorities live, Kyiv neglected them 
until 2014. However, since the Russian annexation of Crimea and the aggression in the Donbass, 
Ukraine has been taking comprehensive measures aimed at decommunisation and derussifica-
tion. The consequences of this include on the one hand a Ukrainisation of the public space, the 
media and the education system, and on the other restricting national minorities’ rights in Ukraine 
as regards the use of their language in the education system. For those reasons, both sides are 
likely to firmly stick to their stances and to be looking for current political benefits resulting from 
the conflict rather than taking action to reach a compromise. 
A protocol of discord
Since the early 1990s, a certain dose of distrust 
has invariably been present in Ukrainian-Hun-
garian relations. Even though economic and 
political co-operation between them has been 
normal, issues concerning the rights of the Hun-
garian minority (150,000 people, according to 
the Ukrainian census conducted in 2001) who 
form a dense group in some areas of Zakarpat-
tia Oblast, accounting for 12% of its population, 
would periodically cast a shadow over bilater-
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al relations1. Ukrainian law has vested this mi-
nority with extensive freedoms, including a de 
facto autonomous education system with Hun-
garian as the language of instruction from pri-
mary school to university2. However, Hungarian 
schools in Ukraine are chronically underfunded 
and therefore receive financial and material 
support from Budapest. This, coupled with the 
proximity of the Hungarian border, makes this 
minority poorly integrated with the Ukrainian 
community, and many representatives of the 
young generation are not advanced speakers of 
Ukrainian3.
The new version of the Education Act passed on 
5 September 2017 by the Ukrainian parliament 
was severely criticised by the Hungarian minor-
1 According to the vast research conducted by the Geog-
raphy Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Science, 
the Transcarpathian Hungarian Institute in Berehove 
and the National Policy Research Institute in Budapest 
in 2017, around 131,000 ethnic Hungarians, including 
5,000-6,000 Hungarian-speaking Roma people, live in 
Zakarpattia at present; http://bgazrt.hu/npki/kutatasok/
summa_2017/ 
2 According to official data, 71 Hungarian schools oper-
ate in Ukraine and are attended by 16,000 pupils. In 
turn, according to the Hungarian minority’s estimates, 
the number of schools in Zakarpattia is 107. A private 
Ferenc II Rákóczi Transcarpathian Hungarian Institute 
(II. Rákóczi Ferenc Kárpátaljai Magyar Főiskola) has 
also operated in Berehove since 1996. In compliance 
with the licence granted by Ukraine’s Ministry of Edu-
cation, the institute’s graduates receive master’s diplo-
mas. The institute had 1,210 students in the academic 
year 2017/2018; http://kmf.uz.ua/uk/%D1%96%D0%B-
D%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%8 
6%D1%96%D1%8F/ 
3 For more information see: J. Groszkowski, T. Iwański, 
A. Sadecki, A neighbour discovered anew. the Czech Re-
public, Slovakia and Hungary’s relations with Ukraine, 
‘OSW Report’, August 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/
en/publikacje/osw-report/2017-08-03/a-neighbour-dis-
covered-anew-czech-republic-slovakia-and-hungarys 
ity in Zakarpattia and the government in Bu-
dapest. This criticism was partly justified since 
the new law, and above all article 7, which has 
provoked the greatest controversies, includes 
an entry that lessons in minority languages can 
only be taught in selected classes and only at 
the initial phase of education (pre-school edu-
cation and grades I–IV)4. 
Under the influence of criticism from Hungary 
and Romania, on 29 September 2017 the Ukrain-
ian government asked the Venice Commission to 
pass an opinion on the compliance of the con-
troversial article 7 with Ukraine’s legal commit-
ments regarding national minority rights. The 
opinion passed by the Venice Commission last 
December was ambivalent. On the one hand, 
it was indicated that article 7 did not guaran-
tee the fulfilment of Ukraine’s constitutional 
and international commitments as regards the 
protection of minority rights, and its provisions 
would severely affect national minorities’ rights 
as regards the use of national languages in sec-
ondary school education. On the other hand, 
the Venice Commission concluded that article 7 
was formulated so imprecisely that it was pos-
sible to interpret and implement it in a manner 
that would not infringe upon national minori-
ties’ rights. In the recommendations part of the 
opinion, the Venice Commission suggested en-
abling teaching as many subjects as possible in 
national minorities’ languages, postponing the 
date of full implementation of the regulations 
of the act and excluding private schools from 
provisions of the act. 
Further disputes that have been provoked or 
escalated over the past year are a consequence 
of the conflict over the Education Act. The 
most painful sanction for Kyiv is the fact that 
Budapest has been impeding its co-operation 
with NATO. Hungary has blocked meetings of 
4 For more information on this Act, see: T. Dąborowski, 
T. Piechal, A. Sadecki, Ukraine: a blow against the na-
tional minorities’ school system, ‘OSW Analyses’, 27 Sep-
tember 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
analyses/2017-09-27/ukraine-a-blow-against-national-
minorities-school-system
The new version of the Education Act 
passed in September 2017 by the Ukrain-
ian parliament was severely criticised by 
Budapest. The new tension in bilateral 
relations is a consequence of the unre-
solved dispute over this act.
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the Ukraine-NATO Commission on several oc-
casions on the ministerial level, and also on 
the level of the heads of state during the NATO 
Summit in Brussels in July this year. 
As the dispute continues, the number of an-
ti-Hungarian incidents has increased in Zakar-
pattia Oblast. The office of KMKSZ5, the main 
party of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine 
which closely co-operates with Hungary’s gov-
erning party Fidesz, was set on fire in February 
2018 in Uzhhorod6. Before that, in November 
2017, Ukrainian nationalists attempted to re-
move the Hungarian flag from the building, and 
in September the Ukrainian police arrested two 
men who were reportedly attempting to blow 
up the Hungarian memorial at Verecke Pass. 
The harsh rhetoric the Hungarian government 
has used with regard to Kyiv is provoking in-
creasing outrage in Ukraine also because it 
fits in with Russian propaganda. The Hungari-
an government has emphasised on numerous 
occasions that nationalism and extremism are 
gaining strength in Ukraine, that minorities’ 
rights are not respected, and has questioned 
the Ukrainian government’s ability to maintain 
control within its territory. On 23 May, during 
the first session after the election, the Hungari-
an government passed a memorandum appeal-
ing for a change in NATO’s policy with regard 
to Ukraine. It was pointed out in the memoran-
5 The first unsuccessful attempt was made by Polish na-
tionalists from the organisation Falanga on 4 February 
2018, and the second, successful, one was made by citi-
zens of Ukraine. 
6 S. Panyi, A. Moroz, K. Szczygieł; Western Ukraine burn-
ing. How Russia sets fire to the EU’s external border, 
27 June 2018, https://vsquare.org/zakarpattia-western-
ukraine-burning-how-russia-sets-fire-to-the-eus-exter-
nal-border/ 
dum that Ukraine failed to comply with its inter-
national commitments, and that the state had 
become so weak that it could not perform its 
basic functions. It was emphasised that Ukraine 
posed a challenge to the security of its neigh-
bours, including Hungary, while the context of 
Russian aggression on Ukraine was not men-
tioned at all. The Hungarian minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Péter Szijjártó, accused Ukraine of wag-
ing an ‘international campaign of lies’ against 
Hungary7. He also appealed for sending OSCE 
observers to Zakarpattia (he made this appeal 
for the first time during a panel discussion with 
the Russian minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey 
Lavrov)8.
The inconclusive search for a compromise
Over the past few months a number of at-
tempts to reach an agreement between Hun-
gary and Ukraine have been made9. The United 
States played important role in convincing both 
sides to start negotiations; it began treating an 
improvement of Hungarian-Ukrainian relations 
as one of the conditions for warming its rela-
tions with Budapest. The US diplomacy man-
aged to convince the ministers of Foreign Af-
fairs of Hungary and Ukraine to meet several 
times, but no breakthrough was achieved. The 
chances that a compromise might be achieved 
were the greatest ahead of the NATO summit in 
Brussels on 11–12 July, when Kyiv wanted Hun-
gary to cancel its objection to the meeting of 
the Ukraine-NATO Commission, and Budapest 
7 Representing cross-border Hungarians will remain one of 
the important tasks of foreign policy, 16 May 2018, http://
www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-and-
trade/news/representing-cross-border-hungarians-will-re-
main-one-of-the-important-tasks-of-foreign-policy 
8 Hungary’s FM: OSCE should deploy observers to 
Ukraine’s Transcarpathia region, 8 December 2017, 
ht tp: / /abouthungar y.hu /news- in -br ie f / hungar-
ys-fm-osce-should-deploy-observers-to-ukraines-tran-
scarpathia-region/ 
9 The dispute with Poland and Romania was mitigated be-
cause Warsaw and Bucharest agreed that the Ukrainian act 
could remain in the present form and that relevant regula-
tions should be introduced on the level of executive acts. 
The harsh rhetoric the Hungarian govern-
ment has used with regard to Kyiv is pro-
voking increasing outrage in Ukraine be-
cause it fits in with Russian propaganda.
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started to view this as an option apparently as 
a consequence of the talks on 30 May between 
Minister Szijjártó and Secretary of State Mike 
Pompeo. However, neither the meeting on 22 
June – with the participation of the Ukrainian 
and Hungarian ministers of Foreign Affairs and 
Education – nor the consultations on 11 July in 
which representatives of the Ukrainian ministry 
of education and the Hungarian minority took 
part (in the presence of EU, OSCE and Council 
of Europe observers), caused either of the par-
ties change their stance. 
In addition to this, tension further escalated in 
late July/early August this year. A speech given 
by the Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orbán, 
on 28 July provoked outrage in Ukraine. In the 
speech, he practically ruled out Ukraine’s acces-
sion to the EU and NATO, and at the same time 
criticised the ‘primitive’ policy adopted by Brus-
sels with regard to Russia which, in his opinion, 
is wrongly based on sanctions and which em-
phasises the Russian threat rather than focus-
ing on economic co-operation. The tension was 
further escalated when the Hungarian govern-
ment appointed the ministerial commissioner 
for the development of Zakarpattia. This posi-
tion had already existed for two years and had 
been held by the same person but it had had 
a different name, which was not provocative to-
wards Ukraine: commissioner for coordinating 
co-operation between Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 
county and Zakarpattia, i.e. the regions on the 
Hungarian-Ukrainian frontier. Kyiv announced 
that unless this was cleared up, the commis-
sioner might be banned from entering Ukraine. 
Shortly after this, on 1 August, information ap-
peared that a Ukrainian army battalion might 
be deployed in Berehove, a city inhabited pre-
dominantly by the Hungarian minority. 
The Hungarian context
Supporting Hungarian minorities is tradition-
ally one of the key areas of Hungary’s activi-
ty on the international arena. Right-wing and 
left-wing governments alike have all defended 
Hungarian minorities’ rights. Budapest has tak-
en the stance that rights acquired by minorities 
cannot be restricted and supports their efforts 
to expand their autonomy. Furthermore, over 
the past few years, the Hungarian government 
has caused an escalation of bilateral disputes 
with neighbours and, whenever it can, it brings 
these disputes to the international level (for ex-
ample, blocking Croatia and Romania’s mem-
bership in the OECD) to thus apply pressure on 
the partner. Budapest also readily gives priority 
to individual interests before strategic issues. 
Even though the Hungarian government wants 
Ukraine to maintain sovereignty and strength-
en its bonds with the EU (also in the interest 
of the Hungarian minority), it will not refrain 
from moves that may make it more difficult for 
Ukraine to integrate with Western structures 
and that at the same time can be used to make 
pressure on Kyiv as regards the Hungarian mi-
nority’s issues. 
The deficit of trust in relations with Ukraine has 
greatly affected Hungary’s stance on the Edu-
cation Act. Hungary is accusing Ukraine of wait-
ing to pass the controversial regulations until 
the Association Agreement with the EU had 
come into force. The Hungarian side most likely 
fears that possible concessions would encour-
age Ukraine to make further steps to restrict 
national minorities’ rights. 
The tough stance on Ukraine is also aimed at 
strengthening voter perception of Fidesz as an 
uncompromising defender of the national inter-
ests and of compatriots living outside Hungary. 
Budapest has taken the stance that rights 
acquired by Hungarian minorities cannot 
be restricted and supports their efforts to 
expand their autonomy.
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Over the past few years, Budapest has stood 
up especially firmly in defence of the Hungarian 
minority of Romania. However, since Hungary 
is currently trying to improve its relations with 
Romania, the dispute with Kyiv will most likely 
be presented to voters as proof of the uncom-
promising stance taken by the government led 
by Fidesz. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that 
Hungary has intentionally stoked the dispute, es-
pecially given the fact that it will inflict only mi-
nor political losses on Hungary in the short run. 
Nor can it be ruled out that Hungary’s extreme-
ly critical opinions about Ukraine have been 
aimed at winning the Kremlin’s favours ahead 
of Orbán’s official visit to Moscow scheduled 
for mid September this year. There has been 
a certain degree of tension in Hungarian-Rus-
sian relations over the past few years: con-
cerning the development of the Paks nuclear 
power plant (for example, the participation of 
Hungarian subcontractors, the launch dates of 
construction), due to the expulsion of a Russian 
diplomat from Hungary and Orbán’s statement 
during the NATO summit in Brussels when he 
admitted in public for the first time that Russia 
is a threat to the alliance. 
Kyiv’s stance
From Kyiv’s perspective, the main goal of 
the act adopted in September 2017 was to 
strengthen the role of the Ukrainian language 
and to weaken that of the Russian language in 
school education in the south-eastern regions 
of the country. The regulations adopted by the 
parliament fit in with the policy of Ukraine’s 
decommunisation and derussification that has 
been consistently pursued since the annexa-
tion of Crimea and the Russian aggression in 
eastern Ukraine. The accusations from Hungary, 
Romania and Russia (amongst other countries) 
concerning restrictions on teaching in national 
minorities’ languages have been disregarded 
and deemed hysterical and groundless. In the 
case of ethnic Hungarians, Kyiv has emphasised 
on numerous occasions that it is unacceptable 
for some of its citizens, even if they have a dif-
ferent ethnic background, not to know the of-
ficial language of the country they live in. It has 
been argued that improving the command of 
Ukrainian will help representatives of minorities 
integrate with the Ukrainian state for example, 
for employment purposes. 
The opinion passed by the Venice Commission 
in December 2017 was viewed as fair in Ukraine. 
The Ukrainian Ministry of Education agreed 
with most of the recommendations from the 
Venice Commission and expressed its readiness 
to adopt specific regulations of the secondary 
school education act being prepared to make 
the provisions of article 7 more precise. Regard-
less of these conciliatory statements, the most 
prevalent stance in Ukraine is that expressed by 
the speaker of the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian 
parliament), Andriy Parubiy, who has stated 
that article 7 will remain unchanged10. No real 
moves to put the Venice Commission’s recom-
mendations into practice have been made for 
months. The direct meetings of Orbán and Po-
roshenko have also failed to result in any break-
through, even though in July 2018 Poroshenko 
reportedly promised Orbán that the dialogue 
concerning article 7 would continue between 
the ministers of Education and Foreign Affairs 
and that the Venice Commission’s recommen-
dations would be promptly implemented. 
The Ukrainian government’s unwillingness to 
put the Venice Commission’s recommenda-
10 Жодних змін до мовної статті закону „Про освіту” 
не буде, - Парубій, Censor.net, https://ua.censor.net.
ua/news/3038458/jodnyh_zmin_do_movnoyi_statti_
zakonu_pro_osvitu_ne_bude_parubiyi 
Russia will stoke the Hungarian-Ukrainian 
dispute because its strategic goal is to iso-
late Ukraine and halt its rapprochement 
with Western structures.
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tions into practice results from the belief that 
ethnic Hungarians in Zakarpattia know the 
official state language to an insufficient de-
gree and that provisions of article 7 are right. 
Furthermore, the unfriendly rhetoric employed 
by Budapest (which is viewed as revisionist in 
Ukraine: the statements concerning the need 
to establish a Hungarian autonomy outside the 
country, the appointment of the commission-
er for the development of Zakarpattia Oblast 
and the Hungarian prime minister’s appeals for 
lifting the sanctions imposed on Russia) also 
makes Kyiv unwilling to take further steps to-
wards a compromise. It is believed in Ukraine 
that Orbán and Putin have similar views on 
certain issues. Therefore, accepting Hungary’s 
demands would be viewed as yielding to the 
Kremlin’s blackmail. 
The escalating conflict in the diplomatic sphere 
is also reflected in the mass media. Even mod-
erate commentators in Ukraine admit that 
Hungary is interfering with Ukraine’s internal 
affairs11. Opinions suggesting that even prepa-
rations for annexation of Zakarpattia are being 
made are increasingly widespread12. Hungary is 
viewed as an unfriendly state, and nationalist 
circles brand the Hungarian minority as ‘Bu-
11 С. Сидоренко, Д. Тужанський, Уповноважений на 
конфлікт: Будапешт дав старт новому загостренню 
з Україною, 3 August 2018; https://www.eurointegra-
tion.com.ua/articles/2018/08/3/7085170/ 
12 М. Розумний, Нескромні амбіції Угорщини: чи 
повторить Закарпаття долю Криму чи Донбасу, 6 Au-
gust 2018; https://www.unian.ua/politics/10215419-ne-
skromni-ambiciji -ugorshchini-chi-povtorit-zakar-
pattya-dolyu-krimu-chi-donbasu.html 
dapest’s fifth column’, which is expressed in 
growing numbers of demonstrations held by 
Ukrainian nationalists from the organisations 
Svoboda, Carpathian Sich and National Corps 
in cities across Zakarpattia. Such actions are 
criticised by local governments, while attempts 
to set offices of the Hungarian minority’s or-
ganisations or memorials on fire are interpreted 
(at times not unreasonably) as Russian provoca-
tions aimed at escalating the conflict between 
ethnic Ukrainians and Hungarians on the local 
level. Hennadiy Moskal, the governor of the 
oblast (since July he has also been the head of 
the local structures of the Petro Poroshenko 
Bloc) is a staunch supporter of mitigating the 
disputes. He has openly criticised the Education 
Act and has consistently pursued a policy of 
co-operation with Budapest (ensuring supplies 
of chlorine and measles vaccines to Zakarpat-
tia), which seems to be aimed at maintaining 
the coalition of the Hungarian and the presi-
dential parties in the oblast’s council. 
Outlook
The most likely scenario in the coming months 
is the continuation of Hungarian-Ukrainian ten-
sion. Proposals of new acts concerning citizen-
ship and language are waiting to be considered 
in the Ukrainian parliament. Already at the 
present stage they are viewed by Hungary as 
aimed at further restricting national minorities’ 
rights. It is difficult to state which bills will final-
ly be put to the vote, but it should be expect-
ed that stricter requirements for holding more 
than one citizenship will be introduced and mi-
norities’ rights concerning the use of their lan-
guages will be restricted. Thus the dispute with 
Ukraine over minorities’ rights will continue, es-
pecially given the fact that the presidential and 
parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2019 and 
the European election in Hungary in May 2019 
may encourage politicians to capitalise on the 
conflict to achieve their goals on the political 
scene at home. 
In the coming months, tension in relations 
between Budapest and Kyiv will contin-
ue, and a systemic resolution of the dis-
pute over the Hungarian minority’s rights 
seems impossible without both a compro-
mise on the top political level and US me-
diation.
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The deficit of trust between Ukraine and Hun-
gary makes both sides extremely cautious about 
any possible concessions. Hungary claims that 
the only solution is to amend article 7 of the 
Education Act and does not agree to ensuring 
education in the native language on the level 
of executive regulations or a separate act on 
secondary school education. On the other 
hand, Ukraine, despite numerous promises, 
principally has not fulfilled any of Budapest’s 
demands, including postponing the implemen-
tation of the provisions of the Education Act 
until 2023 or excluding private education from 
the provisions of the act. Thus an improvement 
of Ukrainian-Hungarian relations will also de-
pend on the effectiveness of external media-
tion and pressure from third-party countries to 
resolve the dispute, above all the United States. 
Russia will most likely aim to escalate the 
Hungarian-Ukrainian dispute because its stra-
tegic goal is to isolate Ukraine and halt the 
process of its integration with Western struc-
tures. 
A durable resolution of the conflict seems im-
possible without a compromise on the top 
political level. Over the past few years, Hunga-
ry has only been able to improve its relations 
with other neighbours with whom it also has 
disputes over national minorities after Prime 
Minister Orbán had reached a compromise 
with the leaders of these countries. In the case 
of Slovakia this was the deal struck in 2012 with 
the then Prime Minister Robert Fico despite re-
strictions of minorities’ rights that were more 
serious than those introduced in Ukraine (for ex-
ample, a ban on holding dual citizenship). Sim-
ilarly, in the case with Romania, the process of 
rebuilding bilateral relations really began only 
after Orbán and the leader of the parliamentary 
majority in Romania, Liviu Dragnea, had made 
relevant arrangements. However, in both of 
these cases Hungary saw tangible benefits of the 
compromises, such as strengthening the Viseg-
rad Group (Slovakia) or energy co-operation 
(Romania). Hungary does not see such benefits 
in a compromise with Ukraine. Nor does the un-
certain future of President Poroshenko’s power 
in the context of elections scheduled for next 
year encourage Hungary to strike a deal with 
the present Ukrainian authorities. 
